From Essays After Montaigne
It is dangerous to assaile a man whom you have bereaved of all other meanes to escape or shift for himselfe but by his weapons; for necessitie is a violent school mistris, and which teacheth strange lessons: 'No biting so grievous as that of necessitie provoked and enraged.'
And we are accustomed to say with some show of reason, that especially in matters of warre the events depend (for the greatest part) on fortune: which seldome will yeeld, or never subject her selfe unto our discourse or wisdome, as say these ensuing verses:
'Tis best for ill advis'd, wisdome may faile,
Fortune proves not the cause that should prevaile,
But here and there without respect doth saile,
A higher power forsooth us over-drawes,
And mortall states guides with immortall lawes.
But if it be well taken, it seemeth that our counsels and deliberations doe as much depend of her; and that fortune doth also engage our discourses and consultations in her trouble and uncertaintie. 'We reason rashly, and discourse at random,' saith Timeus in Plato: 'for even as we, so have our discourses great participation with the temeritie of hazard.'
Based on the American experience in Vietnam, Colin Powell proposed a doctrine (which now bears his name) to guide policy makers so that we wouldn't find ourselves in such a mess again. He suggested six conditions that should exist prior to committing American military forces to a conflict:
- A vital American interest is threatened.
- Sufficient resources will be committed to ensure decisive victory.
- The objectives are clearly defined.
- The commitment will be sustained as long as necessary.
- The public and Congress will support the effort.
- All other options have been exhausted.
Even before invading Iraq, there were questions as to whether or not all of those conditions existed (especially the last one). In hindsight, it appears that the first condition didn't exist, and, before long, it may become clear that others didn't exist either. Even though we've declared an end to the hostilities in Iraq, can we really claim a decisive victory if most of Saddam Hussein's administration is still at large and Iraqis are killing English and American soldiers at an alarming clip? What exactly are our objectives in Iraq? For how much longer are we prepared to maintain a significant military presence in Iraq? Will the administration's media campaign be able to continue to extract the necessary public and legislative support?
A careful look back at events in Afghanistan before our rush into Iraq may have made the matter clearer. It appears that conditions in Afghanistan have devolved into the type of chaos that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place (and there are reports that suggest that they may be in power again soon), and our military doesn't seem to be doing much there but getting attacked every once in a while. Where are the clearly defined objectives and the sustained commitment? With Osama bin Laden free and terrorist activity continuing around the world, where is the decisive victory? As a New Yorker, I can't believe that anything has been accomplished to make me any safer than I was prior to the destruction of the World Trade Center. To be fair, I don't know exactly what could be accomplished, but if that's true, why are we angering a huge portion of the world's population?
Given the uncertainty that Montaigne persuasively argues will prevail in a war, why not stick to the few doctrines or axioms that we've managed to glean from our experience? A doctrine is useless if you find yourself arguing that it's somehow inappropriate every time it might be applied. I think Powell's doctrine is a reasonable, pragmatic place to start, but it still seeks certainty (decisive victory, clear objectives, sustained commitment, etc.) where little is likely to be found. As it stands, it could probably be used by pacifists to argue that pretty much any military action is a bad idea (which may explain why it was discarded as soon as the administration wanted to invade Iraq). But, borrowing heavily from Montaigne, I'm going to propose my own alternatives to the doctrine's conditions:
- Victory can be defined in a way that will be accepted by the public and the enemy. It must be clear to the enemy when they have been defeated.
- The enemy has a viable alternative to fighting or dying. There must be a situation in which it's in the enemy's best interest to accept defeat.
- Military strategy cannot assume the effectiveness of overwhelming force or moral superiority.
At the close of World War II, Mussolini, Hitler, and Hirohito couldn't convince anyone that they had achieved victory of any sort, but after the formal close of hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are still in a position where they can claim victory on their terms. After the defeat that they had no choice but to admit, Italy, Germany, and Japan were rebuilt into prosperous industrial nations, but nothing like that seems to be on the horizon for Iraq or especially Afghanistan. And the decisive factor in the Allied victory in World War II may well have have been code-breaking intelligence. Contemporary intelligence has been an unmitigated disaster. Instead, we've relied to our detriment on overwhelming force and moral superiority. But whether you used Powell's doctrine or mine, the quagmires in which we find ourselves engaged would have been predictable.
9:00:39 AM 
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